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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
DUTY TO WARN EXTENDED TO NON-COMMERCIAL
VENDOR SELLING CHATTEL "AS IS"
The ignition system of T's pickup truck had a safety switch to
prevent the engine from being started when the automatic transmis-
sion was in gear. When T accidentally broke the safety switch, the
ignition system became inoperable. To remedy that situation, T
joined the wires of the ignition system so as to bypass the broken
safety switch. He knew this modification made it possible to start
the truck even when the transmission was in gear. Later the motor
broke down, and T had the truck towed to defendant's dealership,
where he sold it "as is" to defendant. T did not tell defendant
about his modification of the ignition system.' Defendant did not in-
spect the truck.2 Two weeks later defendant's mechanic, while repair-
ing the truck, started the engine; the truck suddenly moved foward
and struck plaintiff. In plaintiff's action for personal injuries, defend-
ant impleaded T as third party defendant. The trial court granted T's
motion for summary judgment and dismissed him from the suit. On
appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Held:
An individual selling his chattel to another is subject to3 a duty to warn
'Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 445, 423 P.2d
926, 927 (1967):
[T] did not disclose to [defendant] that he had modified the safety mechanism
in the ignition system, but he did say that the motor was inoperable and that
the drive shaft was not in place.
The court did not attach any significance to T's disclosure of his truck's other
mechanical difficulties. The important fact was that he said nothing about the
dangerous condition created by his modification of the ignition system. See 2
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment g (1965).
2 T sold his truck to defendant as part of a trade-in transaction. At the time of
the sale, the truck was seven years old. The motor was inoperable and the drive
shaft had been removed. Thus it was not necessary for defendant to inspect the
truck in order to place a value on it and complete the transaction.
Even though T did not see defendant inspect the truck, he was not required to
give a warning if he reasonably believed that defendant would realize the dangerous
condition of the ignition system. 2 RESTATEIENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (b)
(1965). However, because the truck could not be operated at the time of the
transaction, a trier of fact could find that T, the vendor,
... had no reason to believe that [the vendee] would realize the dangerous con-
dition of the pickup, at least until repairs had been inade to the motor so that
the track could be operated again.
Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 446, 423 P.2d 926,
928 (1967) (emphasis added).
The vendor has a duty to warn only if the circumstances of the sale are found
to satisfy the requirements illustrated in note 11, infra. Because the principal
case was an appeal from summary judgment, the court remanded the case so that the
trier of fact could consider the negligence issue. On the other hand, the effect of a
[ VOL. 43 : 475
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
the vendee of a condition, known to the vendor, which makes the
chattel dangerous for its intended use, even though the sale is made
"as is." Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d
443, 423 P.2d 926 (1967).
It is well established that a commercial vendor4 can be held liable
for negligently failing to warn his vendee of a condition, known to
the vendor, that makes the chattel sold dangerous for its intended
use.5 This duty to warn has been justified as an application of the
general principle that one has a duty to avoid exposing others to
unreasonable risks of bodily harm.6 In the principal case the Wash-
ington Court was faced with two questions of first impression:
whether an individual making an occasional sale is subject to the
duty to warn; 7 and if he is, whether the individual can affect his
negligence liability merely by selling the chattel "as is." A related
issue to be discussed is the effect an "as is" sale would have on the
negligence liability of a commercial vendor under similar circum-
stances.
With respect to the duty of the supplier of a chattel to disclose
conditions, known to him, that make the chattel dangerous for its
intended use, the court in the principal case adopted 2 Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 3388 without discussion.' After finding T to be
sale "as is" was decided as a matter of law. Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor
Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 448, 423 P.2d 926, 929 (1967).
'The term "commercial vendor" is used in this note to refer to producers or
distributors of chattels who are in the business of selling those chattels. A com-
mercial vendor is thus distinguished from an individual who occasionally sells a
chattel that he owns. The reason for the distinction is that a commercial vendor
develops a level of expertise on which his .vendees rely. See State v. Barnes, 126
N.C. 1063, 35 S.E. 605 (1900).
A special situation should be noted. For example, a retailer of shoes who sells
his neon advertising sign to another party would be considered an individual
making an occasional sale with respect to that sign. He is a commercial vendor of
shoes but not of neon signs. See id.5Butler v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 296 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1961); Walker v.
National Gun Traders, Inc., 116 So.2d 792 (Fla. 1960); Wellington v. Downer
Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64 (1870); Golden Gate Hop Ranch, Inc., v. Velsicol
Chemical Corp., 66 Wn. 2d 469, 403 P.2d 351 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1025(1966).
'Eldredge, Vendor's Tort Liability, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 306, 310-13 (1941).
'As recently as 1941, Dean Prosser noted that the liability of an individual
selling a chattel for negligent failure to warn had apparently not been considered by
any court. W. PRossEm, TORTs 682 (1st ed. 1941). Apparently, as of 1965 the duty to
warn, as formulated in the RESTATEMENT, had not yet been imposed on an individual
making an occasional sale. RESTATEMENT Ir THE COURTS, Torts § 388 (1945, Supp.
1954, Supp. 1965). However, the duty has been imposed on an individual who is bailor
of a chattel. Cases cited in note 60 infra.
82 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)OF TORTS § 388 (1965):
Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use
is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the
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within the ambit of that section,1 ° the court held that the undisputed
facts would allow reasonable minds to conclude that T was negligent."
Although the court recognized that parties may "bargain for exemp-
tion from liability for the consequences of negligence" 12 if they clearly
express an intention to do so,13 the court rejected T's contention
that as a matter of law he could not be held liable for negligence
because he sold his truck to defendant "as is." 4 After noting that
chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use,
for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and
by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be
dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied
will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition
or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 445, 423 P.2d
926, 928 (1967).
102 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment c (1965) (emphasis added)
Persons included as "suppliers." The rules stated in this Section... apply to
determine the liability of any person who for any purpose or in any manner
gives possession of a chattel for another's use, or who permits another to use
or occupy it while it is in his own possession or control, without disclosing
his knowledge that the chattel is dangerous for the use for which it is
supplied .... These rules, therefore, apply to sellers, lessors, donors, or lenders,
irrespective of whether the chattel is made by them or by a third person.
"Given T's knowledge of the effect of his modification of the ignition system
and his undisputed failure to warn defendant, his vendee, of that modification,
T would be liable to defendant under the rule of 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 388 (1965) if the trier of fact found that T:
1. supplied his truck to defendant for the purpose of repair and resale, and
2. had reason to know that the truck was likely to be dangerous when used for
that purpose, and
3. had reason to expect that third parties would be endangered by this use,
at least while the truck remained in defendant's possession, and
4. had no reason to believe that defendant would realize the dangerous condition
of the truck, at least until the motor was repaired.
Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 444, 446, 423 P.2d 926,
927, 928 (1967).
12 Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 447, 423 P.2d
926, 928 (1967). Broderson v. Rainier Nat'l Park Co., 187 Wash. 399, 60 P.2d
234 (1936) states the general rule. For discussion of restrictions on contracting
away liability for negligence, see Comment, Contractual Exemption from Liability
for Negligence, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 120 (1956); Comment, Contracting Against
Liability for Negligent Conduct, 4 Mo. L. Rxv. 55 (1939).
' Luedeke v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 120 Neb. 124, 231 N.W. 695 (1930).
' T based his argument on Pokrajac v. Wade Motors, Inc., 266 Wis. 398, 63
N.W.2d 720 (1954), and Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co., 158 Ohio St. 465, 110 N.E.2d
419 (1953). However, in both those cases the sale "as is" was made in a context
that precluded finding the vendor liable for negligent failure to warn. In Pokrajac,
supra, the purchaser expressly agreed that he had examined the vehicle and knew
what he was buying. The contract of sale provided, in part:
In case the car covered by this order is a used car, the undersigned purchaser
states that he has examined it, is familiar with its condition, is buying it as a
used car, as is, and with no guaranty as to condition ....
Pokrajac v. Wade Motors, Inc., 266 Wis. 398, 399, 63 N.W.2d 720, 721 (1954). The
vendor in the principal case made no inspection of the truck, and the court dis-
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an "as is" sale normally excludes warranties,"5 the court concluded
that "the term 'as is' by itself amounts solely to a disclaimer of
warranty."' Absence of warranties does not preclude liability for
negligence.' Therefore, T could be held liable for a negligent failure
to warn even though he sold his truck "as is."
A vendor's duty to warn was recognized at an early date as a
particularization of one's general duty to avoid exposing others to
unreasonable risks of bodily harm.'" Recent cases have imposed this
duty on the commercial vendor under varying circumstances. He
must warn his vendee of a condition which he has reason to know
makes the chattel dangerous when used" or dangerous if used in a
particular way. 0 However, the vendor does not have to warn of
danger which he reasonably believes to be known to the vendee."'
tinguished Pokrajac for that reason. Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70
Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 445, 448, 423 P.2d 926, 927, 929 (1967). Thrash was dis-
tinguished on the ground that the injury there occurred after the vendee had resold
the vehicle as a reconditioned used vehicle without replacing a mismatched lock
ring on a wheel. Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co., 158 Ohio St. 465, 110 N.E.2d 419
(1953), discussed in note 41 infra; Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70
Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 448, 423 P.2d 926, 929 (1967). Thus, because the facts of both
Thrash and Pokrajac precluded finding the vendor liable, there was no negligence
liability for an "as is" sale to disclaim. Therefore, in neither Thrash nor Pokrajac
was the fact of a sale "as is" of itself held to be an express assumption of risk by
the vendee.
' Champlin v. Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co., 269 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1959);
Robinson v. Carter, 77 A.2d 174, 177 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1950) (dictum); First
Nat'l Bank of Elgin v. Husted, 57 Ill. App. 2d 227, 205 N.E.2d 780 (1965)
(alternative holding); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-316(3)(a)(1966); 23
MINN. L. REv. 784, 793 (1939).
"°Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 447, 423 P.2d
926, 928 (1967). See discussion in note 54 infra.
12 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 547 n.6 (1966); W.
PROSSER, TORTS 491 (2d ed. 1955).
" E.g., Wellington v. Downer Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64 (1870). See
Eldredge, Vendor's Tort Liability, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 306, 310-13 (1941).
E.g., Roberts v. United States, 316 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1963) (toxic chemical).
E.g., Hopkins v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 199 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1952)
(although a construction worker can be expected to know about the general danger
of working with dynamite, the manufacturer may have a duty to warn of the specific
danger created by loading dynamite into a freshly drilled hole in hard rock while
other holes are being drilled close by); cf. Hopkins v. E.I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 212 F.2d 623 (1954), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 872 (1954) (same case as above;
on appeal after retrial held that manufacturer did not have a duty to warn, because
additional facts produced at the new trial showed that the vendee knew about the
specific danger); Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 139 Wash. 341, 246 P. 945 (1926)
(held that manufacturer gave sufficient warning that its tractor might flip over
backwards if power was suddenly applied to the rear wheels when mired in mud).
Instructions for use are not necessarily sufficient to discharge the duty to warn
of danger created by improper use. 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LLABILrrY §8.05 [1] (1966); Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for
Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. Rzv. 145 (1955).
' Bradshaw v. Blystone Equip. Co., 79 Nev. 441, 386 P.2d 396 (1963) (dangerous
condition apparent to casual observer); Dalton v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 37
Wn.2d 946, 227 P.2d 173 (1951) (danger of exposing skin to wet cement is within
common knowledge).
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Although the commercial vendor's duty to warn was established
at an early date,22 he was initially liable for negligence only to a
relatively small class of persons. Early cases barred recovery by
one not in privity of contract with the vendor.2 3 As courts began to
accept the proposition that injury to a subvendee is a foreseeable
consequence of the negligence of a commercial vendor, the privity
requirement was gradually eliminated.2 4 It is now generally accepted
that a commercial vendor's liability for negligence with respect to
chattels he sells extends to third parties not in privity of contract
with him.2 5 The development of this area of negligence law has
been primarily concerned with deciding to whom a commercial vendor
owes a duty of reasonable care rather than with establishing his duty
to warn.26
Unlike a commercial vendor, an individual who makes an occasional
sale does not have a business reputation at stake, and consequently
his vendee is less likely to expect him to stand behind his product.2
Nevertheless an individual, like a commercial vendor, is generally
required to avoid exposing others to unreasonable risks of bodily
harm . 2  For that reason the individual who sells a chattel should
Although the general danger of using a chattel is apparent, the vendor may be
required to warn of a specific danger that is not apparent. E.g., Hopkins v. E.I.
duPont de Nemours & Co., 199 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1952), discussed briefly in note 20
su pra.
'See note 18 supra.
' See the cases discussed in Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120
F. 865, 868 (8th Cir. 1903). The rule was justified as a necessary limit to a vendor's
liability. Id at 867, 869.
' Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903);
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
Huset is a classic example of how the privity requirement was gradually under-
mined by the exceptions that were made to mitigate the harshness of the general
rule. Recovery was allowed against the manufacturer of a threshing machine found
to have been imminently dangerous to life and limb, by one not in privity of
contract with him. The exception was made on the basis of
... the underlying principle of the law of negligence, that it is the duty of every
one to so act himself as to so use his property as to do no unnecessary damage to
his neighbors ....
Id at 866. For further discussion of how privity was eventually removed from
negligence actions, see Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Other Than
Their Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L. REv. 134, 136-39 (1937) ; 21 MINN. L. REv. 315,
315-21 (1937).
- Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946); Freeman v.
Navarre, 47 Wn.2d 760, 289 P.2d 1015 (1955).
- Discussed at notes 18, 24 supra.
'This is a reason usually given to justify imposing the implied warranty of
merchantability on merchants. See Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable
Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117, 118-22 (1942). This warranty is an alternative to
negligence as a basis for recovery. See Prosser, supra, at 117. It is advantageous to
the vendee because he does not have to prove that the vendor was negligent. E.g.,
11 KAN. L. Rav. 168 (1962). Warranty liability is beyond the scope of this Note.
' James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. Rav. 44 (1955).
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be subject to the duty to give his vendee a reasonable warning.29
This conclusion, reached in the principal case, is merely an applica-
tion of the general principle underlying the commercial vendor
cases.
3 0
The court resolved the negligence issue by adopting 2 Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 338.31 This rule was properly applied in the
principal case to an individual who knew of the condition that created
the danger. 2 Given a vendor's knowledge of the chattel's condition,
it is for the trier of fact to decide whether from that knowledge he
had reason to know that the chattel was dangerous for its intended
use.3 This requires an inference from condition to danger. The
Restatement rule also applies to a vendor who has reason to know,
from facts generally within his knowledge, of a condition that is
likely to render the chattel dangerous.34 This requires an inference
from known facts to condition to danger. It is for the trier of fact
to determine whether the vendor knew or had reason to know of the
condition and whether he knew or had reason to know of the danger.
Any expertise the vendor may have will influence the determinations.3 5
A review of past cases suggests that a manufacturer, and occasionally
a distributor," of chattels has a duty to acquire knowledge about the
'In each case, it must first be determined whether the vendor does have a duty
to warn. See, e.g., note 11 supra. If he does have the duty, then he must exercise
reasonable care to communicate his knowledge of the danger in order to make safe
use of the chattel likely. 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment b
(1965). Although subject to liability to subsequent users of the chattel, 2 RESTATE-
MENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment a (1965), a vendor is not necessarily
required to warn the users. A vendor can discharge the duty by warning his
vendee, if it is reasonable for him to rely on his vendee to eliminate the danger of
which he has been made aware or to pass the warning on to subsequent vendees.
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment n (1965). Thus in the principal
case, although plaintiff could have sued T directly, T would have satisfied the duty
to warn by telling defendant about his modification of the ignition system of his
truck.
'Discussed at p. 485 supra.
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §388 (1965), quoted in note 8 supra.
'Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 444, 423 P.2d
926, 927: "[T] was well aware of the effect of the modification he made."
Butler v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 296 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1961) (manufacturer
knew that corrosion of steel containers by its product would produce explosive
hydrogen gas; from this knowledge it should have inferred that containers filled with
its product were dangerous in the absence of a warning to call attention to the
importance of handling the containers carefully and keeping them away from ex-
cessive heat).
" James, Products Liability, 34 TExAs L. REv. 44, 48 (1955). Professor James
notes the distinction between "dangers known to the supplier" (see notes 32 and
33 and accompanying text, supra) and "conditions known to [the supplier], the
danger of which a reasonable man in his place would recognize." Id.
1 2 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 289(b) (1965).
'This manufacturers' duty is also imposed on one who supplies a chattel as his
own product. Kasey v. Suburban Gas Heat of Kennewick, Inc., 60 Wn.2d 468, 374
P.2d 549 (1962) ; 2 RETATEmENT (SEcoND) Or TORTS § 400 (1965).
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chattels he places on the market 7 in addition to a duty to warn.3'
These cases require him to supplement his existing knowledge with
additional facts so that he can make an inference, reasonable in light
of his position as manufacturer, from those additional facts to condi-
tion to danger. This additional duty should not be placed on the
individual, because he lacks the manufacturer's special knowledge and
opportunity to make the chattels safe.3"
The expertise of the vendee will affect the existence of the vendor's
duty to warn. If a chattel is sold to a vendee who deals in goods of
that kind as part of his business,4" one might expect that, because
of his experience, he would be more likely than an individual to
realize a chattel's dangerous condition, and hence be less apt to
need a warning.4  This element is incorporated into the Restatement
' Roberts v. United States, 316 F.2d 489, 494 (3d Cir. 1963) (manufacturer of
chemical should know its toxicity); Mealey v. Super Curline Hair Wave Corp.,
342 Mass. 303, 173 N.E.2d 84 (1961) (manufacturer of hairdressing lotion should
know that it might cause scalp burns); Bock v. Truck & Tractor, Inc., 18 Wn.2d
458, 139 P.2d 706 (1943) (duty applied to dealer who sold second hand car as a
reconditioned used car). There is language suggesting this duty in Golden Gate
Hop Ranch, Inc. v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 66 Wn.2d 469, 474, 403 P.2d 351, 355
(1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1025 (1966); cf. Kasey v. Suburban Gas Heat, Inc.,
60 Wn.2d 468, 374 P.2d 549 (1962).
A retailer who does not sell a chattel as his own product does not have this duty
with respect to that chattel. Simmons v. Richardson Variety Stores, 52 Del. 80,
137 A.2d 747 (Super. Ct. 1957); Ringstad v. I. Magnin Co., 39 Wn.2d 923, 239
P.2d 848 (1952).
The rule of Restatement § 388 does not itself require a vendor to make any
inspection, "no matter how cursory." 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388,
comment in (1965).
'The manufacturer's duty to acquire additional knowledge about his product
complements his duty to warn. See cases cited in note 37 suepra. On the other hand,
a duty to make reasonable inspections is separate from the duty to warn, and
provides an alternative basis for recovery. E.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
The distinction between the duty to inspect and the duty to acquire additional
knowledge is illustrated by the somewhat extreme case of Hopkins v. E. I. duPont
de Nemours & Co., 199 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1952). A construction worker was killed
while loading a drill hole with dynamite manufactured by defendant. The dynamite
exploded prematurely because of the unusually high temperature and vibration
created by drilling in hard rock. Defendant was held subject to liability for
negligently failing to warn of the specific danger created by loading the dynamite
into a hole freshly drilled in hard rock while other holes were being drilled close by,
even though defendant had no actual knowledge of his specific danger. See id. at
933 n.3. The court held that defendant was required to have this knowledge. The
result was reached on the basis of defendant's failure to warn; there was no claim
the defendant negligently failed to inspect the dynamite. Id. at 932.
' Cf. cases cited in note 37, supra.
" See the definition of "commercial vendor," note 4 supra.
" In Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co., 158 Ohio St. 465, 110 N.E.2d 419 (1953), the
defendant sold his used vehicle "as is" to an automobile dealer. After resale, the
dealer's vendee was injured when an insecure lock ring on a wheel caused the
vehicle to go out of control. In refusing to hold defendant liable for failing to warn
of this dangerous condition, the Ohio Court relied on the dealer's duty to inspect
the vehicle before selling it as a reconditioned used vehicle. Id. Messrs. Frumer
and Friedman seem to interpret Thrash as holding that an individual who sells his
used car to an automobile dealer cannot be held liable to a vendee of the dealer for
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rule, which considers the vendor's reasonable belief that the vendee
will realize the danger in determining whether or not the vendor
has a duty to warn in a particular case.42 The reasonableness of
the vendor's belief is controlling; actual failure of the vendee to
realize the danger is unimportant.43
Once the possibility of a vendor's liability for negligent failure
to warn is acknowledged, it must be decided whether selling a chattel
"cas is" is sufficient to vitiate that liability. At the outset a distinction,
implicit in the result of the principal case, 4 should be noted between
the two alternatives available to the vendor who desires to avoid
the risk of liability. He can preclude liability by insisting on a
provision in the contract of sale whereby the vendee agrees to assume
the risk of the vendor's negligence.45 Or, he can bring to the attention
of the vendee facts which constitute a warning of danger sufficient
under the circumstances to preclude a finding of negligence. 6 In
the principal case the vendor did neither.
failing to warn. 2 L. FRumER & M. FaIEDr.AN, PRODUCTS LIABI.ITY 466 (1966).
This interpretation of the holding is too broad.
The Restatement rule adequately covers the resale situation. An owner who sells
his vehicle to a dealer without warning of a dangerous condition, but who reason-
ably believes that the dealer will realize the danger, would not be found negligent.
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (b) (1965). If the owner does warn the
dealer, he probably would not be found negligent. See 2 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND)
OF TORTS § 388, comments g, n (1965). In these two instances, the Ohio Court's
reluctance to impose too heavy a burden on the owner should be vindicated. If,
however, the owner gives no warning, and cannot reasonably believe that the dealer
will discover the particular dangerous condition that later causes injury, then he
should be subject to liability for negligence under the Restatement rule. See 2 RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 388, comment b (1965); cf. id., comment e. The
view of Frumer and Friedman is too broad because it does not account for the
latter possibility.
2 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 388(b) and comment k (1965).
"Thus, in the principal case the vendee did fail to realize, until after the time
of plaintiff's injury, that the truck could be started when the transmission was in
gear. However, the court left it to the trier of fact to determine whether T had
reason to believe that defendant would realize the dangerous condition. Fleming
v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 446, 423 P.2d 926, 928(1967), quoted in note 2 supra.
" See discussion at pp. 492-93 infra.
"References cited notes 12, 13 supra.
"The vendor can preclude a finding of negligence against him by giving his
vendee an adequate warning. 2 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment
g (1965); Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to
narn, 41 VA. L. REv. 145 (1955). He may accomplish the same objective indirectly
by requiring his vendee to inspect the chattel and purchase it in reliance solely on
his inspection. See the treatment of Pokrajac v. Wade Motors, Inc., 266 Wis. 398,
63 N.W.2d 720 (1954), by the court in the principal case. Fleming v. Stoddard
Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 448, 423 P.2d 926, 929 (1967), discussed
in note 14 supra. However, the vendee's inspection will insulate the vendor from a
finding of negligence only if the vendor can reasonably believe that the inspection
as made by the vendee will reveal the dangerous condition of the chattel to the
vendee. See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (b) (1965) and comment k;
cf. George v. Willman, 379 P.2d 103 (Alas. 1963). In George the vendor of a trailer
was held liable to the vendee for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability
19671
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Selling a chattel "as is" cannot by itself be sufficient to discharge
a vendor's duty to warn. The purpose of a warning, if one is required,
is to eliminate danger by providing the vendee with the vendor's
knowledge of the chattel's dangerous condition.47 The term "as is"
does not communicate that knowledge. Nor, in the principal case,
would the vendor have sold his chattel "as is" in order to disclaim
the implied warranty of merchantability. That warranty does not
arise when an individual makes an occasional sale.4" Therefore, it
could be argued that in a sale by an individual without warranties,
a purchase "as is" constitutes as a matter of law an express assump-
tion by the vendee of the risk of the vendor's negligence." Otherwise,
the argument proceeds, the term "as is," intended by the parties to
mean something, is rendered meaningless. The difficulty with that
argument is its assumption that the term "as is" is always intended
to limit the vendor's liability for physical harm. That assumption
is inaccurate. Parties to a sale could very well intend the term
"as is" to be an expression of their agreement that the vendor is
not required to restore the chattel to a particular state of repair.5"
So used, "as is" would not be intended as an assumption of the
risk of physical harm.
Underlying the court's disposition of the principal case is the
premise that a sale "as is," without more, can vitiate a vendor's
liability for negligence only if the term is interpreted as an express
assumption of risk by the vendee. There is a heavy burden of
proof on a party who asserts that someone else has agreed to assume
when the trailer was destroyed by a fire caused by loose fuel line fittings. The
court said, at 105:
[The vendors] may not escape their warranty of merchantable quality on the
ground that [the vendee] had inspected the trailer, for the reason that the defect
was a hidden mechanical deficiency which would not be discernible by the
ordinary person using reasonable care while looking over a trailer with a view
toward purchasing it as a family home.
," See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment g (1965).
' The implied warranty of merchantability applies only to sales by merchants.
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-314(1) (1966) (effective midnight, June 30, 1967);
Cosway, Sales-A Comparison of the Law in Washington and the Uniform Com-
,nercial Code, 35 WASH. L. REv. 617, 626 (1960); see WASH. REv. CODE §
63.04.160(2) (1925) (applicable to the principal case; superseded by WASHa. REv.
CODE ANN. § 62A.2-314(1) (1966)).
" Cf. 39 VA. L. REv. 387 (1953). This argument was not presented to the court in
the principal case. Brief of Respondent, Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70
Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 423 P.2d 926 (1967).
'For example, suppose A offers to buy B's pickup truck for $500, if B will
repair the tailgate and fix a tear in the seat. B rejects that offer. After a period of
bargaining, A says, "O.K., I'll pay $450 for your truck, as is, and fix the seat and
tailgate myself." B accepts. It is doubtful that A, by using the term "as is," intended
to assume all risk of hidden mechanical dangers about which B remained silent.
See Swisher v. Miami Motors, 81 Ohio App. 97, 72 N.E.2d 682, 684 (1947)
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the risk of his negligence. 51 When used to avoid tort liability, the
term "as is" ordinarily is intended to be a disclaimer of implied
warranties." This meaning does not communicate to a vendee that
he has assumed all risk of the vendor's negligence with respect to
the chattel sold.53 For this reason, a sale "as is," without more,
does not exempt from negligence liability an individual who sells a
chattel. 4 It is submitted that the same rule should apply to sales
by commercial vendors. 5
The Restatement imposes the duty required by § 388 on any person
who supplies a chattel for another to use.56 Because the court adopted
§ 388 without discussion, it is not entirely clear that the rule will be
broadly applied in the future. However, because the significant act
is the supplying of a chattel for another's use,57 without regard to
economic benefit, the rule should also apply to donors,55 lessors,5 9
and all kinds of bailors60 of chattels.
(dictum); cf. Draisner v. Schlosberg, 57 A.2d 202 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1948).
' E.g., Leudeke v. Chicago & N.W.Ry. Co., 120 Neb. 124, 231 N.W. 695 (1930);
6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1472, at 602-04 (1962); see 6 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS§ 1825, at 5169-70 (1938).
'Cases cited note 15 supra; cf. Stalik v. United States, 247 F.2d 136 (10th Cir.
1957).
By purchasing a chattel "as is," the vendee is willing to take the risk of an
unprofitable bargain, generally in consideration of a reduced price. See Findley
v. Downing Motors, Inc., 79 Ga. App. 682, 54 S.E.2d 716 (1949); Johnson v.
Waisman Bros., 93 N.H. 716, 36 A.2d 634 (1944); Swisher v. Miami Motors, 81
Ohio App. 97, 72 N.E.2d 682, 684 (1947) (dictum). This does not mean that he intends
to take the risk of personal injuries caused by hidden danger. See James, Products
Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 192, 210-11 (1956); see also Stalik v. United States,
247 F.2d 136 (10th Cir. 1957).
" This proposition is established as a matter of law by the principal case.
Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 448, 423 P.2d 926,
929 (1967). The court states that "the term 'as is' by itself amounts solely to a
disclaimer of warranty." Id. at 447, 423 P.2d at 928 (1967) (emphasis added).
By distinguishing Pokrajac v. Wade Motors, 226 Wis. 398, 63 N.W.2d 720 (1954),
rather than rejecting it, the court appears to have left open the possibility that a
sale "as is," together with additional evidence, may preclude a vendor's liability
for negligent failure to warn. See the discussion in note 14, supra, for a possible
example (vendee's agreement that he had examined the chattel and knew what he was
buying).
The failure of a sale "as is" to commnicate to a vendee that he has assumed
all risk of the vendor's negligence does not depend on the identity of the vendor.
See notes 15, 53 supra, and authorities cited.
' 2 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 388, comment c (1965), quoted in note
10, supra.
'Id. See James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 44, 45-47 (1955).
'Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 267 Mass. 501, 167 N.E. 235 (1929);
2 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment c (1965), quoted in note 10,
supra; cf. Ruth v. Hutchinson Gas Co., 209 Minn. 248, 296 N.W. 136 (1941)
(duty to warn did not arise because donor of gas had no actual knowledge of the
dangerous condition).
' Monroe v. East Bay Rental Service, 111 Cal. App. 2d 574, 245 P.2d 9 (1952);
La Rocca v. Farrington, 301 N.Y. 247, 93 N.E.2d 829 (1952); 2 RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment c (1965), quoted in note 10, supra.
' Mikel v. Aaker, 256 Minn. 500, 99 N.W.2d 76 (1959) (gratuitous bailor); 2
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The court reached a correct result in the principal case. Imposing
the duty to warn on an individual, in appropriate circumstances, is
consistent with the general principle of negligence law that an indi-
vidual should not expose others to unreasonable risks of physical
harm.6 ' No one should have the privilege to foist on someone else
machinery that he knows to be dangerous. If a vendor wants to
avoid the risk of liability, he can try to obtain an express assumption
of risk from the vendee. In practice, this may not be feasible. -
His alternative is to give his vendee adequate warning. An advantage
of this alternative is that dangerous conditions are more likely to
be made safe if the vendee is put on notice that they exist. It is
also the safest course for the vendor to follow, and demands no
more than reasonable attention to the safety of others.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment c (1965), quoted in note 10,
supra; Thomas v. Ribble, 404 Pa. 296, 172 A.2d 280 (1961) (owner brought car to
garage to have it repaired).
"1 James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 44, 44-47 (1955).
12 In a sale by an individual to a dealer, the vendor may lack bargaining power
sufficient to obtain such an agreement. In a sale to an individual, if the vendee is
asked to sign a contract whereby he agrees to assume all risks of harm caused by
the chattel, he may begin to wonder what is wrong with the chattel and decide to
buy elsewhere.
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